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Deductive reasoning is an inference-making process that allows
ne to reach valid conclusions on the basis of prior information.
hile deductive inference-making has often been demonstrated
o be fundamental to human cognition (Braine & O’Brien, 1998;
ohnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994), it has also been shown
hat people fall prey to biases that are often inconsistent with
ormative theories of logic (Evans, 1989; Stanovich, 2004). For
xample, a large body of evidence in the reasoning literature
hows that participants have difﬁculty disconﬁrming hypothe-
es (Nickerson, 1998), and are highly inﬂuenced by the semantic
Evans, 1983) content of logical arguments. How to interpret this
iscrepancy between the observed behavior of reasoners and the
ormative standardsof logichasbeen the subject of a long-standing
ebate, some researchers arguing that the gap was reﬂecting irra-
ionalities of thinking (Evans, 1984, 2003; Stanovich, 2004), while
thers emphasizing the fact that it was themanifestation of perfor-
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oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.04.017rs to detect that the letter–number pair H7 veriﬁes the conditional rule
not a 4 than to detect that it veriﬁes the rule If there is an H then there
& Noveck, I. A. (2007). Overcoming perceptual features in logical reason-
agnetic resonance imaging study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19(4),
difﬁculty was due to mismatching effects, i.e. perceptual mismatches that
d in the rule (e.g. T and 4) mismatch those presented in the test-pair (H
to test this claim directly by recording ERPs while participants evaluated
ce or absence of mismatches. We found that mismatches, not only trigger
wn to be related to perceptual mismatch) but that they, parametrically
o mismatches prompt a greater N2 than one). Our results indicate that
onditional rules is to focus attention on the negated constituent but also
-individual differences in the way participants apprehend such negations,
tween N2 amplitude and participants’ reaction times. Overall, these ﬁnd-
ng perceptual features plays a role in the mismatching effect and extend
f the N2 into a reasoning task.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
mance errors and computational limitations (Oaksford & Chater,
1995, 1996).In conditional reasoning, it has been demonstrated that nor-
mative performances can be negatively inﬂuenced by perceptual
mismatches between features mentioned in a rule and a test-item
(Evans, 1972). In order to illustrate this bias, consider the two con-
ditional rules below:
(1) If there is a P then there is a 4.
(2) If there is not a T then there is not a 7.
Both of the above rules are veriﬁed by the letter–number pair
P4. However, it has been shown that participants experience more
difﬁculty detecting that P4 conﬁrms the rule in (2) than it con-
ﬁrms the rule in (1) (Evans, 1998). This effect is believed to occur
because, for the rule in (2), the lexical content of the rule (the
letter T and the number 7) does not match the letter–number
pair verifying it (the letter P and the number 4). This effect has
been termed matching bias (Evans, 1998), which underlines how
matching cases encouragequicker responses, ormismatching effects
(Prado & Noveck, 2007), which underlines howmismatches lead to
errors and slowdowns.
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As it is the case for other reasoning biases, there is a debate
about the rational or irrational nature of the mismatching effects.
One school of thought posits that the effect is due to a low-level
heuristic that compels reasoners to consider relevant only features
mentioned in the rule (i.e. T7 in the rule in (2)); the result is that they
do not immediately attend to the logical demands of the task (i.e.
detecting that P4 conﬁrms the rule in (2) (Evans, 1998). Detecting
that P4 conﬁrms the rule in (1) does not involve such mismatches
and thus prompts optimal performance.
Given the important role of negations in this type of task it is
important to point out that this approach defends the idea that the
word not, at its core, simply denies. We refer to this as the narrow-
scope view. More concretely, when being informed that There is not
an T, this says only what the letter in the item is not; the sentence
is not necessarily suggesting a search among potential alterna-
tives (this view represents a competing account that we describe
immediately below). With a narrow-scope view, a second piece of
information indicating, e.g., that the item has an H is viewed as a
source of mismatch (between the two highlighted letters) rather
than being the source of ﬁnding a logical compatibility with not
a T. Given that this theory considers these mismatching effects as
resulting from a heuristic process, we will refer to this account as
the heuristic account throughout the present paper.
The alternative account defends a rational explanation of this
phenomenon in arguing that participants’ occasional failures with
such (complex) sentences are due to computational errors linked
to the processing of negations (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). In this
case, the word not compels one to consider alternatives from the
relevant contrast-class (e.g. other letters; other numbers) and to
then conﬁrm that the elements in the test-item are among the
alternatives. In other words, this account (which we will refer to
as the contrast-class account) argues that a negation leads a lis-
tener to consider the many things that the denied proposition can
be. When considering the proposition There is not a T, a reasoner
has to imagine another possible letter (i.e. the phrase not T prompts
a search for non-T letters). According to this account, the arrival of
a second piece of information containing an acceptable alternative
(e.g. where the letter is an H) should appear logically compatible
and prompt ready conﬁrmation. If a reasoner has to contend with
two negations, as in If there is not a T then there is not a square, the
number of contrast classes increases and so does the amount of
needed calculation (and potential for error).
To date, behavioral studies investigating mismatching effects
in conditional reasoning have provided mixed evidence regard-
ing the heuristic or rational nature of the bias. On the one hand,
Oaksford and Stenning (1992) have found that the mismatching
effects receded when the construction of the contrast classes was
facilitated, providing evidence for a rational explanation of the bias.
For example, they showed that participants experience less difﬁ-
culty dealing with mismatches when they reasoned with realistic
conditional rules (e.g. If the boss doesn’t want to see me, then I’ll
be home in time for dinner), or when the size of the contrast-
class is relatively small (Oaksford & Stenning, 1992). More recently,
Oaksford andMoussakowski (2004) directly contrastedpredictions
from the heuristic and the contrast-class accounts within the same
experiment. The authors manipulated independently both mis-
matches and set sizes in conditional statements and found that
reasoners’ behavior was more driven by the size of the contrast set
than by the presence ofmismatches, providing additional evidence
for the contrast-class account.
On the other hand, examination of participants’ reaction times
during a classic conditional reasoning task gives support for the
heuristic account of themismatching effects. Indeed, using a varia-
tion of the truth-table task, we found themismatching effects to be
systematic on conditional rules with respect to both reaction timesia 46 (2008) 2629–2637
and rates of correct responses, as subjects were required to either
verify or falsify conditional rules (Prado & Noveck, 2006). That is,
rates of correct responses were generally lower and reaction times
weregenerally slowerwhen the featuresmentioned in the rulemis-
match those in the test-item. The effect is also present even in the
absence of negations in rules. For example, it takes a signiﬁcantly
longer time todetermine that the itemH-in-a-circledisconﬁrms the
rule If there is an H then there is a square (1-mismatch) than it does
to verify the rule If there is an H then there is circle (0-mismatch).
Our study also provided evidence in favor of a narrow-scope viewof
negations. Indeed, we showed that when participants are required
to verify a rule such as If there is an H then there is not a square, a
test-item such as an H-in-a-square (0-mismatch) leads to reliably
higher rates of Correct Rejections than does an item such as H-in-
a-circle (1-mismatch) provides Hits. Such a result argues against
the idea that participants construct contrast classes when faced
with negations in conditional rule. Instead, they more likely focus
their attention on the negated constituent (square in the example
above) and have to overcome perceptual mismatches when they
are confronted to another piece of information (circle in the exam-
ple above). These results are in-line with the heuristic account of
the mismatching effects.
Recently, we investigated the neural bases of the mismatching
effects using fMRI (Prado &Noveck, 2007).We demonstrated that a
network composed of the medial prefrontal cortex (dorsal anterior
cingulate [dorsal ACC] and pre-supplementary motor area [pre-
SMA]), the mid dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC) and
the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) was more engaged when par-
ticipants reasoned in the context of a mismatching rule than when
the rule did not entail any mismatch. Interestingly, several studies
have suggested that this frontoparietal network is associated with
attentional orienting (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and is involved
in selecting between task-relevant and task-irrelevant information,
thus allowing goal-directed behavior. For example, these regions
are found tobeactivatedwhenparticipants areasked to ignore task-
irrelevant information, like the meaning of the word in the Stroop
paradigm or an infrequent stimulus in an oddball task (Milham,
Banich, & Barad, 2003). In our fMRI study, we found that (i) activ-
ity in this network was parametrically modulated by the amount
of perceptual mismatch between items in the rule and in the tar-
get item and (ii) was independent of the amount of negations in
the rule. That is, reasoning on the rule If there is an H then there is
not a square yielded more activation in this cerebral system when
participants had to provide a Hit (1-mismatch;H-in-a-circle) than a
CR (0-mismatch;H-in-a-square). Such a result is consistentwith the
idea that participants considermismatching features in conditional
rules as logically irrelevant, and need to overcome this tendency to
provide a logical (task-relevant) response in this task (Evans, 2003).
Although both the behavioral and the fMRI ﬁndings described
above suggest that negations in conditional rules are processed
narrowly, arguments in favor of such a claim would be more con-
vincing if one could provide additional, independent evidence. This
is why we turn to investigations that concern an ERP component
that has been reliably associated with mismatch: the frontocentral
N2. As recently reviewed by (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008), there is
long-standing literature suggesting that the frontocentral N2 (an
ERP component typically elicited 200–400ms following the pre-
sentation of a speciﬁc stimulus) reﬂects themismatch between two
stimuli. Such an effect has been demonstrated by Gehring, Gratton,
Coles, and Donchin (1992), using a modiﬁed version of the Erik-
sen ﬂanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In the typical ﬂanker
task, a central target stimulus is presented simultaneouslywith two
surrounding ﬂankers, and the subjects are asked to respond based
on the target and to ignore the ﬂankers. The ﬂankers can indicate
the same response as the target (e.g. SSSSS) or a different response
holog
might be concealing a strategy fromparticipantswho, not only nar-
rowly interprets the negation but, go a step further by considering
alternatives. Arguably, suchparticipants (anticipate and) compute aJ. Prado et al. / Neuropsyc
Table 1
Truth values and Mismatch levels for the rules AA and AN
Rule Hit Correct Rejection
If H then square (AA) H-in-square0 H-in-circle1
If H then not circle (AN) H-in-square1 H-in-circle0
Notes. Subscript refers to level of mismatching.
(e.g. SSHSS). Taking advantage of a cued version of this ﬂanker task,
Gehring et al. found that the amplitude of the N2 time-locked to
the target array was parametrically modulated by the amount of
mismatch between the cue and the target. For example, the N2was
greater when the target SSSSS was preceded by the cue H than by
the cue S, or when the target HHSHH was preceded by the cue S
than by the cue H.
More recently, Wang et al. (2003) presented participants with
pairs of sequential geometrical ﬁgures differing or not in term of
perceptual features. They foundagreaterN2when the second stim-
ulus mismatched the ﬁrst one, as compared to when there was
a perfect match. A subsequent study from the same team (Wang,
Cui, Wang, Tian, & Zhang, 2004) showed that the amplitude of this
mismatch-related N2 was also dependent on the number of mis-
matching features (with greater amplitude formaximalmismatch).
Comparable results have been found in several other studies inves-
tigating perceptual changes in physical attributes as diverse as
shape (Wang, Wang, Kong, Cui, & Tian, 2001), color (Wang et al.,
2001), or spatial position (Yang & Wang, 2002).
The frontocentral N2 is also a component that is reliably elicited
in paradigms involving a certain degree of stimulus novelty, like
in oddball tasks. In an oddball task, subjects are presented with a
mixture of frequent and typically unique target or non-target stim-
uli. Although participants’ task is to detect only targets, a greater
N2 is elicited when a novel (i.e. typically unique) stimulus appears
(for a review, see Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). The amplitude of
this ‘novelty’ N2 does not depend on the fact that the stimulus
is a target or not (Courchesne, Hillyard, & Galambos, 1975), but
is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by its physical complexity (Courchesne
et al., 1975; Daffner et al., 2000). This suggests that it may reﬂect
the deviance from a mental template stored in short-term or long-
term memory (Daffner et al., 2000). As noted by Folstein and Van
Petten (2008), such an interpretation is consistentwith results from
sequential matching tasks discussed above and raises the hypoth-
esis that this component is involved in more general mismatch
detection mechanisms.The mismatch sensitivity of the frontocentral N2 makes it a
perfect candidate to shed light on the mismatching effects in con-
ditional reasoning, as well as on the way negations are processed
in such statements. As in the prior work, we employ a paradigm
known as the truth-table veriﬁcation task (Evans, 1972) in which
subjects are presented with conditional rules similar to the one
presented with respect to (1) and (2) in order to judge whether a
given target item is veriﬁed or not by the rule. For example, see
Table 1 and consider the two conditional rules below:
(3) If there is an H then there is a square.
(4) If there is an H then there is not a circle.
Both of the above rules are veriﬁed by the item H-in-a-square
(i.e. Hit response) and falsiﬁed by the itemH-in-a-circle (i.e. Correct
Rejection). However, providing a Hit response in each rule involves
dealing with different amounts of mismatch: a Hit response would
not entail mismatch at all for the rule in (3) (0-mismatch), but it
would require dealing with one mismatch for the rule in (4) (1-
mismatch). On the contrary, correctly rejecting the rule in (3)would
imply dealing with more mismatching information (1-mismatch)ia 46 (2008) 2629–2637 2631
than correctly rejecting the rule in (4) (0-mismatch). Based on
our previous studies suggesting that the perceptual mismatches
are on the basis of the mismatching effects, we predict a greater
mismatch-relatedN2 for CRs thanHits for the rule in (3) (i.e. greater
mismatch for 1-mismatch that for 0-mismatch), but a greater N2
for Hits than CRs for the rule in (4) (i.e. greater mismatch for
1-mismatch that for 0-mismatch). That is, one should show a
crossover interaction between the Rule and the Type of response.
The same reasoning ought to apply to the rules (5) and (6) below,
which differ from (3) and (4) in that they have negations in the
antecedent as well. These, too, are veriﬁed by the item H-in-a-
square (Hit) and falsiﬁed by the item H-in-a-circle (CR):
(5) If there is not a J then there is a square.
(6) If there is not a J then there is not a circle.
In the rule in (5), one would predict greater mismatch (thus
greater N2) for CRs (2-mismatch) than Hits (1-mismatch). The
reverse pattern should be observed for the rule in (6) (greater N2
for CRs than Hits). In other words, a crossover interaction between
the Rule and the Type of Response should also be apparent on these
rules (5) and (6).
Finally, we consider individual differences. In prior work (Prado
& Noveck, 2006), we proposed that the two (narrow and contrast-
class) accounts are compatible. We hypothesized that the initial
reading of a negation will be narrow and in some scenarios this
might be enough. However, the interlocutor (a participant) can fur-
ther process the negation, leading to an analysis of alternatives;
thus it could pay off to anticipate (that not a square can ready one
for a circle). This led us to propose a potential two step process,
where the search for alternatives is part of second process. Here,
we aim to test this hypothesis by focusing on Hit items in AN rules
(those having an afﬁrmative in the antecedent and a negation in the
consequent as in If there is an H then there is not a square), where
only the consequent requires the interpretation of a negation.
When one considers these Hit items (e.g. H-in-a-circle with
respect to the rule above), a participantwith only a narrow-reading
of negationswould have to focus her attention on the inconsistency
andwould have slower reaction times and a greater N2, as our prior
ﬁndings have shown.However, this (potentially dominant) strategycontrast-class that would simplify a search for anH in a non-square.
Such a participant aims to anticipate potential contrasts andwould
ultimately have a relatively fast reaction time (from the moment
that the test-item appears) and a small N2. If our hypothesis is
supported, this would amount to a negative1 (between-subject)
correlation between reaction times and N2 amplitude in this con-
dition.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty healthy native French-speaking volunteerswith no history of neurologi-
cal or psychiatric disorders participated in the study. Fiveparticipantswere excluded
from the analyses due to excessive eye movement artifacts in the EEG signal, and
one because her overall mean RT was above 2.5 standard deviations from the mean.
The remaining 14 participants (8 males) were aged between 22 and 40 (mean age:
28 years). All subjects were right-handed asmeasured by the Edinburg Handedness
Inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971).
1 The correlation shouldbenegativebecause thegreater theN2, themorenegative
is its voltage.
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2.2. Materials
A single trial was composed of a conditional if-then statement (in French) fol-
lowed by a pictorial target item. The conditional rule described a letter and shape
relation (e.g. If there is an H then there is a square) and the target item was based
on a letter-in-shape combination, so that it consisted of a picture showing, e.g.,
an H-in-a-square. This was designed to limit saccades. Trials were prepared based
on the number of mismatching elements between the conditional rule and the
target item (see Fig. 1A). Hence, trials were separated into three different condi-
tions, 0-mismatch (i.e. no mismatch), 1-mismatch (i.e. moderate mismatch), and
2-mismatch (i.e. full mismatch). In the 0-mismatch condition, the pictorial item
completely matched the letter and shape mentioned in the rule (e.g. in order to ver-
ify the rule If there is an H then there is a square, it would be followed by the target
item H-in-a-square); in the 1-mismatch condition, only one element was present in
the rule and the target item (e.g. in order to verify the rule If there is not a J then
there is a square, it would be followed by a target item such as H-in-a-square); in
the 2-mismatch condition, the pictorial item mismatched both the letter and shape
mentioned in the rule (e.g. in order to verify the rule If there is not a J then there is not
a triangle, it would be followed by a target item such as H-in-a-square). Four rules
were used in the paradigm (based on the presence or absence of a negation in the
antecedent of the rule and the presence or absence of a negation in the consequent
of the rule). AA was afﬁrmative throughout (e.g. If there is an H then there is a circle),
AN presented a negation in the consequent of the rule (e.g. If there is an H then there
is not a square), NA presented a negation in the antecedent of the rule (If there is not
a J then there is a circle), and NN presented a negation in both the antecedent and
consequent of the rule (e.g. If there is not a J then there is not a square).
We were concerned with those cases that yield unambiguous responses. Thus,
90 out of 100 trials per condition contained items that had a true antecedent. The
remaining 10 stimuli per condition presented a letter that was irrelevant to the
antecedent of the conditional rule; this leads to a non-obvious evaluation (consider
the rule If there is a J then there is a square and the item H-in-a-square).2 These 10
were included in order to avoid predictability in the task andwere considered ﬁllers.
Half of the 90 relevant trials were conﬁrming cases (e.g., an item like H-in-a-square
veriﬁes the rule If there is an H then there is a square) and half disconﬁrming cases
(e.g., the item H-in-a-square ought to be rejected with respect to the rule If there is
an H then there is not a square). The 36 target items were composed of one of six
letters presented as a capital in bold (H, I, J, P, Q and R) and one of six shapes (square,
circle, star, diamond, rectangle and triangle) in the central visual ﬁeld.
2.3. Tasks and procedure
Visual stimuliweregeneratedwithPresentation10.2 software (Neurobehavioral
Systems, http://www.neurobs.com/) and displayed on a computer screen. Each trial
startedwith the presentation of a visual ﬁxationmark (a central dot) in the center of
the screen for 500ms (see Fig. 1). The twoparts of the conditional rule then appeared
one line at a time, with the ﬁrst part (e.g. “If there is an H”) appearing at 500ms and
the second part (“then there is a square”) at 1500ms. The entire rule then remained
on the screen for a further 3000ms, at which point the rule disappeared and the
central dot reappeared for 500ms. This was immediately followed by the target
item, which remained on the screen until subjects pressed one of two buttons with
their right hand (yes/no response). Variable periods of visual ﬁxations were added
at the end of each trial. That is, the duration of a trial varied randomly between 9250
and 13350ms (mean trial time=11,300ms).
Participants performed the experiment in ﬁve blocks (60 trial presentations in
each). If the item conﬁrmed the rule, participants were required to press the “yes”
key (i.e. “yes, the rule is veriﬁed”); if the item did not conﬁrm the rule, they were
required to press the “no” key (i.e. “no, the rule is not veriﬁed”).
Trial order within each block was randomized and the block order within
each task was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed to
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. The task began with 10 training
trials.
2.4. Electroencephalogram (EEG) recording
EEG was recorded with a 64 channel NetAmps 200 system (Electrical Geodesics
Inc.). Ampliﬁed analogue voltages (0.1–100Hz bandpass) were sampled at 250Hz.
Electrode impedance was kept below 60k. All channels were referenced to Cz
during recording, and off-line re-referenced to the left mastoid. ERP analyses were
conducted using ELAN-Pack software developed at INSERM U821 (Lyon, France).
They consisted in averaging the EEG segments in synchronization with the onset of
the target item in each trial over a 700ms period including a 100ms pre-stimulus
interval. The signals were low-pass ﬁltered (30Hz) and a baseline correction was
calculated from the 100ms pre-stimulus interval. Trials contaminated by eye blinks
2 According to standard logic truth-tables, conditionals containing a false
antecedent are always true, but participants in reasoning experiments typically
consider these ambiguous or confusing.ia 46 (2008) 2629–2637
or eye movements (threshold: ±100V) were not included in the analyses. Also,
analyses were restricted to trials on which subjects made the correct (i.e. logical)
response. The N2 component was deﬁned as the greatest negative peak occurring
within a latency window between 200 and 400ms at 12 central, frontocentral and
frontal sites: Cz, C1, C1′ , C2, C2′ , Fcz, Fc1, Fc2, Fz, Fz′ , F1, F2 (Fig. 1B). In order to
simplify the analyses of ERP amplitudes, data from C1 and C1′ were collapsed into
one C1 site, data from C2 and C2′ were collapsed into one C2 site, and data from Fz
and Fz′ were collapsed into one Fz site. We thus analyzed nine sites, falling into a
frontal/frontocentral/central× left/midline/right array (see Fig. 1B).
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral analysis
Behavioral performances (accuracy and mean reaction times)
are shown in Table 2. Analyses are broken down into three parts.
First, we focus exclusively on the rules containing no negation in
the antecedent (i.e. AA and AN). Second, we analyze participants’
performance using data from the two remaining rules NA and NN
(with a negation in the antecedent). Third, we consider the overall
main effect of mismatch collapsing all the four rules AA, AN, NA,
and NN.
Usingonlybehavioral data fromthe rulesAAandAN,wecarried-
out a 2×2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
the factors Rule (AA vs. AN) and Response-Type (Hit vs. CR) on
correct RTs. This ANOVA revealed a main effect of Response-type
(F(1,13) =8.07, p<0.05; Hit: 1260ms, CR: 1360ms), a main effect
of Rule (F(1,13) =32.74, p<0.001; AA: 1163ms; AN: 1497ms), and
a Response-Type×Rule interaction (F(1,13) =18.33, p<0.001). That
is, Hit responses were faster than CR responses for the rule AA (Hit:
942ms; CR: 1304ms), whereas the reverse pattern was observed
for the rule AN (Hit: 1578ms; CR: 1416ms).
A second within-subject ANOVA with the factors Rule (NA vs.
NN) andResponse-type (Hit vs. CR)was subsequentlyperformedon
correct RTs from the rules NA and NN. This ANOVA showed a main
effect of Response-Type (F(1,13) =17.29, p<0.01; Hit: 1552ms, CR:
1890ms) and amarginally signiﬁcant interaction betweenRule and
Response-Type (F(1,13) =4.09, p<0.07). That is, it was faster to pro-
vide a Hit than a CR for the rule NA (Hit: 1418ms; CR: 1881ms),
but this difference was smaller for the rule NN (Hit: 1686ms;
CR: 1900ms). The main effect of Rule did not reach signiﬁcance
(F(1,13) =2.42, p=n.s.; NA: 1650ms, NN: 1793ms).
In a ﬁnal analysis, we collapsed all the rules into three dif-
ferent conditions of mismatch (0-mismatch, 1-mismatch and
2-mismatch; see Table 2). Overall, responses were fast when
the pictorial item completely matched with the letter and shape
mentioned in the rule (0-mismatch; 1204ms), they were slower
when there was one mismatch (1-mismatch; 1542ms) and even
slower when there were two mismatches (2-mismatch; 1775ms).
A repeated measures ANOVA conﬁrmed the results above, show-
ing a signiﬁcant main effect of Mismatch-Level on reaction times
(F(2,26) =36.50, p<0.001).
3.2. ERP analysis
As for the behavioral analyses, we ﬁrst focus on the N2 ampli-
tudemeasured for the rulesAAandANacross thenine sites studied.
Fig. 2 displays the ERP data we obtained for these rules on two
representative electrodes. We carried-out a within-subject ANOVA
with the factors Rule (AA, AN), Response-Type (Hit, CR), Anterior-
to-Posterior (frontal, frontocentral, central) and Left-to-Right scalp
locations (left, midline, right) on N2 amplitudes. Although there
was nomain effect of Rule (F(1,13) =0.08, p=n.s.) or Response-Type
(F(1,13) =0.31, p=n.s.), we found a signiﬁcant interaction between
these two factors (F(1,13) =5.95, p<0.05). As anticipated, the N2
amplitude was greater when the subjects had to correctly reject
J. Prado et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 2629–2637 2633
Fig. 1. Experimental procedure and layout of the electrode array. (A) Timing of a sample trial. (B) Electrode layout of the 64 channel geodesic sensor net. Sites of interest are
circled in black and were grouped for statistical analysis. Frontal electrodes are shown at the top of the ﬁgure.
Table 2
Overall behavioral performance
Rule Item Correct Response Mismatching level Percentage Correct RTa
If H then square (AA) H-in-square Yes (Hit) 0 98 942
If H then square (AA) H-in-circle No (CR) 1 97 1304
If H then not square (AN) H-in-circle Yes (Hit) 1 98 1578
If H then not square (AN) H-in-square No (CR) 0 97 1416
If not H then square (NA) P-in-square Yes (Hit) 1 96 1418
If not H then square (NA) P-in-circle No (CR) 2 91 1881
If not H then not square (NN) P-in-circle Yes (Hit) 2 96 1686
If not H then not square (NN) P-in-square No (CR) 1 87 1900
Mean accuracy and reaction times. Notes. This table is based on a model case If there is an H then there is a square, but letters and shapes were varied.
a These are reaction times to correct responses only.
Fig. 2. Stimulus locked grand-average waveforms evoked by the appearance of the target item in the rule AA (A) and AN (B) at the representative sites Fz and Fcz. The graphs
show the waveforms for Hit responses (Hit, dashed black line) and for Correct Rejections (CR; solid black line). The target item onset is at 0ms and the N2 is indicated by an
arrow.
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tionsFig. 3. Stimulus locked grand-average waveforms evoked by the appearance of the t
show the waveforms for Hit responses (Hit, dashed black line) and for Correct Rejec
arrow.
the rule AA (2.64V; 1-mismatch) than when they had to con-
ﬁrm it (4.29V; 0-mismatch) (one-tailed paired t-test, t(13) =1.92,
p<0.05) (Fig. 2A). A signiﬁcant difference in the predicted opposite
prediction was observed for the rule AN, where a Hit (3.60V; 1-
mismatch) yielded a greater N2 than a CR (4.18V; 0-mismatch)
(one-tailed paired t-test, t(13) =1.93, p<0.05) (Fig. 2B). We also
observed amain effect of Left-to-Right scalp location (with smaller
N2 for central sites as compared tomore lateral ones; F(2,26) =4.09,
p<0.05), an interaction between Left-to-Right and Anterior-to-
Posterior scalp location (F(4,52) =3.04, p<0.05), but no interaction
between either Rule or Response-Type and these factors. No other
results were signiﬁcant.
We then focus on the ERP data obtained for the rules NA andNN,
i.e. the tworules entailinganegation in theantecedent (seeTable2).
Again, we entered N2 amplitudes into an ANOVA using Rule (NA,
NN), Response-Type (Hit, CR), Anterior-to-Posterior (frontal, fron-
tocentral, central) and Left-to-Right scalp locations (left, midline,
right) as within-subject factors. The interaction Rule×Response-
type reached signiﬁcance (F(1,13) =4.81, p<0.05), showing greater
N2 for CR (1.75V; 1-mismatch) than Hit (3.14V; 0-mismatch) in
the rule NA (one-tailed paired t-test, t(13) =1.29, p=0.11) (Fig. 3A),
and greater N2 for Hit (1.69V; 1-mismatch) than CR (3.21V;
0-mismatch) in the rule NN (one-tailed paired t-test, t(13) =1.87,
p<0.05) (Fig. 3B). The only other signiﬁcant effect was an inter-
action between Rule and Anterior-to-Posterior, with greater N2 in
anterior than posterior sites for the rule NN, but not for the rule NA.
In an additional analysis, we collapsed ERP data from the four
rules (AA, AN, NA and NN) into three separate conditions of
mismatch (0-mismatch, 1-mismatch, 2-mismatch) (Fig. 4).Within-
subject ANOVAs on N2 amplitudes with Mismatch-Level (0, 1, 2),
Anterior-to-Posterior (frontal, frontocentral, central) and Left-to-item in the rule NA (A) and NN (B) at the representative sites Fz and Fcz. The graphs
(CR; solid black line). The target item onset is at 0ms and the N2 is indicated by an
Right scalp locations (left, midline, right) as factors revealed a
main effect of mismatch (F(2,26) =10.75, p<0.001), a Mismatch-
Level× Left-to-Right scalp location interaction (F(4,52) =2.99,
p<0.05) and a Mismatch-Level×Anterior-to-Posterior× Left-to-
Right scalp location interaction (F(8,104) =5.73, p<0.001). Post hoc
paired t-tests revealed that theN2wasgreaterwhen subjects had to
deal with 1-mismatch than 0-mismatch (two-tailed paired t-test,
t(13) =2.26,p<0.05) andevengreaterwhen theyhad todealwith2-
mismatches than1-mismatch (two-tailedpaired t-test, t(13) =3.00,
p<0.05).Finally, we tested our prediction that there are inter-individual
differences in thewayparticipants process negations in conditional
statements.Moreprecisely,we focusedon the ruleANbecause such
a rule entails only a negation in the consequent (see Table 2). We
found a signiﬁcant negative correlation between N2 peak ampli-
tude and RT only when the participants had to provide a Hit
response (1-mismatch; r=−0.53; p<0.05) (see Fig. 5).
4. Discussion
The present study aimed to record ERPs of participants who
were required to give a correct logical response in the context of
mismatches. Analysis of the behavioral data conﬁrmed and repli-
cated earlier studies showing that mismatches between a rule and
a test-item negatively affect reasoning performance (Evans, 1972;
Prado & Noveck, 2006, 2007).
We found that, although reaction times increasedwith thenum-
ber of negations in the rules, the presence of mismatches between
the rule and the target item was also predictive of the behavioral
performance. That is, evaluating a rule that mismatched the target
J. Prado et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 2629–2637 2635Fig. 4. Stimulus locked grand-average waveforms evoked by the appearance of the target
line), and the 2-mismatch (short dashed black line) conditions across the nine sites of inte
column, and right electrodes in the right column.
itemwas typically associatedwith longer reaction times than eval-
uating a rule that did not entail mismatch. This effect, persistent
even when participants were not required to deal with a different
number of negations in conditional rules, was observed across the
four rules AA, AN, NA and NN.
Fig. 5. Scatterplot showing the N2 amplitude as a function of participants’ reaction
timeswhen they provide aHit response to the rule AN. Each plotted point represents
themean N2 amplitude (over the nine electrodes of interest) and themean reaction
time for a single subject.item in the 0-mismatch (solid black line), the 1-mismatch (medium dashed black
rest. Left electrodes are shown in the left column, midline electrodes in the middle
Analyses of the ERPs revealed that a N2 component emerged at
frontocentral sites 200–300ms following the presentation of the
target item (Figs. 2–4). More importantly, the amplitude of this
component was linked to the presence of mismatching features
between the conditional rule and the target item. N2 amplitude
was greater in the rule AA (e.g. If there is an H then there is a square)
when participants provided a CR (H-in-a-circle; 1-mismatch) than
a Hit (H-in-a-square; 0-mismatch), but greater in the rule AN (e.g.
If there is an H then there is not a square) when participants pro-
vided a Hit (H-in-a-circle; 1-mismatch) that a CR (H-in-a-square;
0-mismatch). Importantly, no difference was observed when the
overall N2 amplitude in the rule AA was compared to the overall
amplitude in the rule AN. That is, neither the Type of response (Hit
vs. CR) nor the presence of a negation (AA vs. AN) appear to drive
the N2, only the presence of mismatch.
This effect on the N2 amplitude was replicated using the rules
NA (e.g. If there is not an H then there is a square) and NN (e.g. If
there is not an H then there is not a square). Here, N2 was greater
in the rule NA for CRs (e.g. J-in-a-circle; 2-mismatch) than Hits
(e.g. J-in-a-square; 1-mismatch), and greater in the rule NN for
Hits (e.g. J-in-a-circle; 2-mismatch) than CRs (e.g. J-in-a-square; 1-
mismatch). Additionally, we collapsed all the conditions and found
that the amplitude of this N2 was parametrically modulated by
the number of mismatches between the rule and the target item,
so that it was greater for 2-mismatches than for 1-mismatch, and
even greater for 1-mismatch than for 0-mismatch (see Fig. 4). Taken
together, the results above show (i) that giving a correct response
on rules involving mismatching is associated with the emergence
of a frontocentral N2, (ii) that the amplitude of this N2 is closely
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related to the level of mismatch between the rule and the target
item, and (iii) that the mismatches are the basis of the N2.
These results are consistent with our previous behavioral and
fMRI experiments. First, using the same paradigm, we showed that
the mismatches themselves, not the negations, were predictive of
reaction times (Prado&Noveck, 2006). That is, when facedwith the
rule AA, we found that participants were longer and less accurate
to provide a CR (1-mismatch) than a Hit (0-mismatch). Here, we
demonstrate greater N2 amplitude for CR than Hit when partici-
pants reasoned on the same rule AA.
This is consistent with a long-standing literature showing that
the frontocentral N2 is highly sensitive to perceptual mismatches.
For example, N2 amplitude has been found to be enhanced when
the degree of perceptualmismatch between two sequential stimuli
was increased (Wang et al., 2003), or when a cue differed percep-
tually from a target (Gehring et al., 1992). Although this effect has
been shown in a variety of stimuli, our study is the ﬁrst to show that
varying the perceptual features between a logical rule and a target
item trigger the same mismatch-related N2. Moreover, we found
in our task that the amplitude of the N2 was parametrically mod-
ulated by the number of mismatching features between the rule
and the target item. This effect is consistent with a previous study
showing a similar parametric modulation of the N2 when differ-
ent levels of perceptual conﬂict were manipulated in a sequential
matching task (Wang et al., 2004).
Our ﬁndings also shed some light on the way negations are
processed in conditional statements.We found a greater N2 ampli-
tudewhen subjects successfully conﬁrmedanANrule (e.g. properly
responded that H-in-a-circle conﬁrms If there is an H then there is
not a square) than when they had to correctly reject it. Giving a Hit
response in that case (e.g.H-in-a-circle) involves dealingwithmore
mismatching information than correctly rejecting the rule (H-in-a-
square). The same effect was observed for the rule NN. This result
strongly suggests that negations are notwidely processed in condi-
tional rules, but rather only serve to focus participant’s attention on
the negated constituent, as stated by the heuristic account (see Sec-
tion 1). That is, when faced with the sentence there is not a square,
the subjects do not consider other alternatives (i.e. other shapes)
and the arrival of a target item involving another shape (e.g. circle)
mismatches the initial statement, leading to longer reaction times
and an enhanced N2. This interpretation is not consistent with the
contrast-class (or rational) account of the mismatching effects. On
the contrary, it supports the view that the mismatching effects
result from a heuristic process. These ﬁndings are also consistent
with the proposal that the N2 may reﬂect a mismatch between a
target stimulus and a mental template (in this case the negated
constituent), as suggested by Folstein and Van Petten (2008).
Can we claim that all participants prefer only a narrow reading
view? Although much of our evidence defends a narrow-reading
view of negations (see above), our ﬁndings also suggest that this
strategy is subject to a reliable inter-individual variability. That is,
participants who were the fastest to provide a Hit response in the
rule AN (involving dealing with one mismatch if the negation is
processed narrowly) were also the ones with the smallest N2. We
propose that this effect arises because these participants process
negationsmorewidely than theparticipants exhibiting longer reac-
tion times (and thus greater N2). Indeed, a participant who would
compute a contrast-class when faced with the proposition there
is not a square would be primed to evaluate the shape circle and
would thus exhibit a smaller N2 (and a shorter RT) than a partic-
ipant who would have a narrow-reading of negations (and would
have to overcome amismatch when faced to the shape circle). Such
a hypothesis suggests that not every participant applies the same
strategy when faced with a conditional rule involving negations,
and could explain some discrepancies in the reasoning literatureia 46 (2008) 2629–2637
concerning the role of negations in themismatching effects (Evans,
1998; Oaksford, 2002).
More generally, these ﬁndings are in-line with inﬂuential
dual-process theories of reasoning. Recently, several researchers
in reasoning and decision making have converged on the idea
that cognitive biases (such as the mismatching effect) could be
explained in terms of an interaction between two different cogni-
tive systems (Evans, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2004). These
dual-systems theories posit that heuristic processes are rooted in
speciﬁc sub-components of a more general cognitive system, often
referred to as the heuristic system (or System1). Although the exact
properties of the heuristic system can vary among theorists, it is in
general believed to be largely automatic, preconscious, fast oper-
ating, and shared by humans and animals. Heuristic processes in
System 1 are hypothesized to have their own neural bases and to
be the source ofmanynon-rational behaviors, includingmismatch-
ing effects (Evans, 2003). To explain why people are nevertheless
able to exhibit a rational behavior, System 1 is thought to com-
pete with an analytic system, termed System 2. System 2 is more
controlled, evolutionary more recent, slow operating and based on
formal rules. It is believed to be the cornerstone of logical reasoning
andhypothetical thinking (although it is assumed to be constrained
by working memory capacity and related to measures of general
intelligence).
On many occasions, such as when no mismatches are present
in a conditional rule, both System 1 and System 2 will provide
the same response on a given reasoning problem. In these cases,
using a fast System 1 process will sufﬁce in terms of computational
resources needed. However, both analytic and heuristic systems
may also provide different competing outputs. This is likely to be
the case when the providing of a correct analytic response involves
dealing with a mismatch between the items mentioned in the rule
(i.e. T7) and those in the letter pair (i.e. P4). That is, in order to
give a logical (i.e. task-relevant) response, subjects have to over-
ride the System 1 heuristic tendency to see these mismatching
cases as irrelevant to the rule. One of the central claims of most
dual-process theories is that it is precisely the role of System 2 to
inhibit System 1 heuristic processes when an analytic response is
needed (Evans, 2007; Stanovich & West, 2000). This is assumed to
be the reason why participants are able to provide a rational and
context-dependent response (Houde & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003).
Interestingly, the N2 has been also linked to cognitive and
inhibitory control. Indeed, this ERP is classically observed in tasks
involving the inhibition of a prepotent motor response, such as the
so-called go/no-go paradigm. In this task, participants are required
to quickly respond to a certain type of stimulus (go) but towithhold
their motor response to another type of stimulus (no-go). Typically,
the N2 is greater after no-go trials than after go trials (Eimer, 1993;
Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999; Jodo & Kayama, 1992;
Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell, 1985). More recently, it has
been proposed that the N2 is more likely to reﬂect the monitoring
of a cognitive conﬂict than the inhibitory process per se (Botvinick,
Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Yeung, Cohen, & Botvinick, 2004). For exam-
ple, usingaclassic interference task (i.e. theFlanker task), (VanVeen
& Carter, 2002) have observed that the frontocentral N2 was both
elicited prior to the motor response and generated by the ACC, a
structure we highlighted in our previous fMRI study on the mis-
matching effect. Although the exact role of the N2 is still under
debate, there is a general consensus that this ERP component is
closely related to effortful cognitive control processes: the greater
its amplitude the more effort involved in controlling cognitive pro-
cesses (and the smaller its amplitude, the better is participants’
performance in interference tasks) (Lamm, Zelazo, & Lewis, 2006).
Our current results show that a similar N2 is evoked when par-
ticipants are faced with mismatches in a reasoning task. Such a
hologJ. Prado et al. / Neuropsyc
ﬁnding could suggest that effortful cognitive control processes are
engaged when participants are faced with mismatches in condi-
tional rules. The N2 elicitedwhen reasoners overcomemismatches
could then be considered the electrophysiological signature of this
inhibition of System 1 by System 2.
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